

United Technologies Corp (UTX)

Rating	OUTPERFORM*
Price (16 Sep 11, US\$)	75.50
Target price (US\$)	91.00 [†]
52-week price range	91.39 - 67.44
Market cap. (US\$ m)	68,607.83
Enterprise value (US\$ m)	75,910.84

*Stock ratings are relative to the relevant country benchmark.
†Target price is for 12 months.

Research Analysts
Julian Mitchell

Sheila Kahyaoglu


Charles Clarke

COMMENT

Going for Goodrich?

- **Media reports (Bloomberg - 9/16) suggest UTX is looking to acquire GR. We think a deal makes strategic and tactical sense and retain our Outperform rating on UTX:**
- **Logic for the deal:** UTX is in the process of revitalising its aerospace platform; the first phase revolves around P&W, which has regained a foothold in the commercial aero market with the GTF engine. An acquisition of GR (mkt cap is 17% of UTX's) would add further momentum to this, giving UTX leading positions in a range of products such as aircraft wheels and brakes as well as engine nacelles. Furthermore, the mix of GR is attractive (43% AM, 66% commercial aero). GR has not been hugely cyclical (-13% EPS decline in 2009) and yet is capable of delivering rapid growth (~10% EPS CAGR 2006-2011E). We think an aerospace deal for UTX it is likely to prove more margin and valuation multiple-enhancing than a fire & security or other construction related transaction. On our estimates, excluding synergies and PPA, at a takeout price of \$125/share, the deal would be 9% accretive for UTX 2012 EPS, with financial leverage proving very manageable (1.6x Net Debt / EBITDA).
- **Risks:** (i) Could the nacelles business (35% of GR sales) suffer as other engine OEMs will be concerned if it shares a parent with P&W? We think this is only a small risk, given Safran and GE established Nexcelle in 2008. (ii) Medium-term, margins are likely near peak at GR given its AM-exposure is earlier-cycle; as OE ramps, margins will be under pressure; (iii) the market reaction to large deals has not been that positive (DHR, SPW); however we think the high growth and high aftermarket content at GR should prove reassuring.

Share price performance



On 09/16/11 the S&P 500 INDEX closed at 1216.01

Quarterly EPS	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
2010A	0.93	1.20	1.30	1.31
2011E	1.11	1.45	1.42	1.51
2012E	—	—	—	—

Financial and valuation metrics

Year	12/10A	12/11E	12/12E	12/13E
EPS (CS adj.) (US\$)	4.74	5.48	6.26	7.03
Prev. EPS (US\$)	—	—	—	—
P/E (x)	15.9	13.8	12.1	10.7
P/E rel. (%)	111.8	113.1	112.9	111.7
Revenue (US\$ m)	54,326.0	59,163.1	63,106.5	66,665.2
EBITDA (US\$ m)	9,156.0	9,723.8	10,748.6	11,631.1
OCFPS (US\$)	6.40	4.51	7.92	8.75
P/OCF (x)	12.3	16.8	9.5	8.6
EV/EBITDA (current)	8.2	7.7	7.0	6.4
Net debt (US\$ m)	6,206	7,303	3,706	-348
ROIC (%)	20.91	19.76	21.17	23.26
Number of shares (m)	908.71	IC (current, US\$ m)		30,484.48
BV/share (Next Qtr., US\$)	24.6	EV/IC (x)		2.5
Net debt (Next Qtr., US\$ m)	6,047.0	Dividend (Next Qtr., US\$)		0.48
Net debt/tot. cap. (Next Qtr.,	29.7	Dividend yield (%)		0.64

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates.

DISCLOSURE APPENDIX CONTAINS IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS, INFORMATION ON TRADE ALERTS, ANALYST MODEL PORTFOLIOS AND THE STATUS OF NON-U.S. ANALYSTS. U.S. Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.

Investment summary

In this report we seek to analyse the merits and risks for UTX if it does acquire Goodrich. Overall, we think the deal makes strategic and tactical sense, in terms of providing fresh impetus to the Aerospace assets at UTX, and the deal is being done at a time when corporates with good balance sheets can raise debt cheaply, and buy assets in highly accretive ways. We show below the effects on UTX's 2012 earnings and balance sheet if it does buy GR.

Exhibit 1: Theoretical M&A Scenarios

\$ in millions, unless otherwise stated

	Current	Potential Targets			Combined Entities		
2012E	UTX	TXT	COL	GR	UTC / TXT	UTC / COL	UTC / GR
Takeout Price (Estimate)		25	76	125	25	76	125
Sales	63,107	12,286	4,956	9,134	75,393	68,062	72,240
EBITDA	10,639	1,387	1,184	1,760	12,026	11,823	12,399
Margin	16.9%	11.3%	23.9%	19.3%	16.0%	17.4%	17.2%
D&A	1,248	424	145	347	1,672	1,393	1,595
EBIT	9,390	963	1,039	1,413	10,353	10,430	10,803
Margin	14.9%	7.8%	21%	15%	13.7%	15.3%	15.0%
Other Costs			-67	-17	0	-67	-17
Interest (Legacy)	-596	-188	-29	-127	-784	-625	-723
Interest (Additional)					-207	-336	-535
PTP	8,795	775	943	1,269	9,362	9,401	9,528
Tax Rate	31%	31%	30%	30%	31.0%	31%	31%
Tax Expense	-2,726	-242	-283	-381	-2,902	-2,914	-2,954
Minorities	-415			-9	-415	-415	-424
Net Income	5,653	533	660	871	6,045	6,072	6,150
NOSH	904	275	146	125	904	904	904
EPS (\$)	6.26	1.94	4.52	6.96	6.69	6.72	6.81
Accretion (\$)					0.43	0.46	0.55
Accretion (%)					7%	7%	9%
Net debt	7,879	2,132	303	715	14,616	15,656	19,988
Net debt / EBITDA (x)	0.74	1.54	0.26	0.41	1.22	1.32	1.61

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

We show GR's key financials below, and the implied acquisition multiples depending on the price that UTX might pay for GR.

Exhibit 2: Goodrich Key Financials

USD in millions, unless otherwise stated

US\$, Dec y/e	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011E	2012E	2013E
Sales	5,878	6,392	7,061	6,686	6,967	7,869	9,031	9,941
YoY%		9%	10%	-5%	4%	13%	15%	10%
EBITDA	886	1,131	1,358	1,179	1,273	1,595	1,760	1,956
Margin%	15.1%	17.7%	19.2%	17.6%	18.3%	20.3%	19.5%	19.7%
EBIT	645	881	1,101	929	998	1,269	1,413	1,578
Margin%	11.0%	13.8%	15.6%	13.9%	14.3%	16.1%	15.6%	15.9%
EPS	3.81	3.77	5.39	4.70	4.51	6.08	6.96	7.89
YoY%		-1%	43%	-13%	-4%	35%	15%	13%

Source: Company data, Factset, Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 3: Implied 2012 Acquisition Multiples

USD in millions, unless otherwise stated

Implied	Offer Price for GR				
	\$100	\$110	\$120	\$130	\$140
EV	13,015	14,245	15,475	16,705	17,935
MV	12,300	13,530	14,760	15,990	17,220
PE	14.4x	15.8x	17.2x	18.7x	20.1x
EV/EBIT	9.2x	10.1x	11.0x	11.8x	12.7x
EV/EBITDA	7.4x	8.1x	8.8x	9.5x	10.2x
EV/SALES	1.42x	1.56x	1.69x	1.83x	1.96x

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

We show below the sensitivity of UTX's 2012 EPS to synergies and the acquisition price of GR.

Exhibit 4: 2012 EPS Sensitivity

\$, unless otherwise stated

		Offer Price for GR				
		\$100	\$110	\$120	\$130	\$140
Synergies	0	6.92	6.87	6.83	6.79	6.74
	40	6.95	6.90	6.86	6.82	6.77
	80	6.98	6.93	6.89	6.85	6.80
	120	7.01	6.96	6.92	6.88	6.83
	160	7.04	6.99	6.95	6.91	6.87

Source: Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 5: 2012 EPS Accretion Sensitivity

%, unless otherwise stated


		Offer Price for GR				
		\$100	\$110	\$120	\$130	\$140
Synergies	0	10.5%	9.9%	9.2%	8.5%	7.8%
	40	11.0%	10.3%	9.7%	9.0%	8.3%
	80	11.5%	10.8%	10.1%	9.5%	8.8%
	120	12.0%	11.3%	10.6%	9.9%	9.3%
	160	12.5%	11.8%	11.1%	10.4%	9.7%

Source: Credit Suisse estimates

We show below the shape of the UTX business in terms of end-market sales split, if GR is consolidated.

Exhibit 6: UTX sales split by end-market, exc-GR


%, unless otherwise stated



Source: Company data


Exhibit 7: UTX sales split by end-market, inc-GR

%, unless otherwise stated



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 8: UTX pro forma geographic sales split inc GR




Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

In terms of GR itself, we show a detailed description in Exhibit 9.

Exhibit 9: Goodrich Company Overview

USD n millions, unless otherwise stated



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Strategically sensible


UTX has not done a large deal for some time (since the GE Security deal for \$1.8bn which was completed in 2010), and, given the CEO's background in the company, it is natural that some large deals would be undertaken in one or more of the aerospace businesses. We think the deal makes sense from a strategic standpoint for the following reasons:

- Renewed momentum in the Aerospace portfolio at UTX;
- UTX is acquiring a high growth, high quality company;
- GR is not hugely cyclical, and has high aftermarket content;
- The deal is a focused one, and should be valuation multiple-enhancing;
- UTX is buying a 'known quantity'; the deal is not a leap into 'white space'.

Revamping the Aerospace Portfolio at UTX


UTX has been seen by investors to have lost ground in Aerospace in recent years, and the weak outlook for US Defense spending has also cast a shadow over the long-term growth prospects for the business. This is important for the stock, as P&W, Sikorsky, and HS account for 45% of group sales and group earnings. In P&W for instance, UTX has lost ground against GE and RR.

Exhibit 10: Aviation Sales and EBIT Margin (2005 vs. 2010)
\$ in millions, unless otherwise stated



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates


Exhibit 11: Market Share of Installed Base
%, unless otherwise stated



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates


In terms of the outlook, although the GTF will indeed help the positioning of Pratt, given its success to date at winning share on the Airbus A320 NEO, the positive effects on earnings and cashflow for UTX may not become apparent until the end of this decade, with GE / Safran likely to continue to dominate commercial aircraft engine market share.

Exhibit 12: Market share of deliveries
units, unless otherwise stated



Source: GE

Exhibit 13: Installed Base Trajectory - Departures
Number of departures, unless otherwise stated



Source: GE

While the GTF does represent a first stage in rejuvenating the Aerospace portfolio at UTX, the decision of Boeing to go with a re-engined 737 (the MAX), rather than a 'clean sheet' aircraft, has meant the earliest Pratt can enter service on a new Boeing narrowbody is likely to be 15 years out or more. Also, on the A320 NEO itself, Safran is claiming 63% market share now, as the LEAP engine has gained huge momentum on the NEO since the Paris Air Show in June 2011. As shown in Exhibit 14, GE has by far the broadest product portfolio in aircraft engines, which means it will likely retain an advantage against UTX for some time to come in this area.

Exhibit 14: Aircraft engine portfolios at the 3 major engine developers

x, unless otherwise stated

GE Aviation

	Genx	GP7000	CFM -LEAP X	CFM56-5B	CFM56-7B	CFM56-5C	CFM56-3	CFM56-5A
Thrust (lbs.)	53k-75k		18k-35k	22K - 33K	18.5K-27.3K	31.2K-34K	18.5K-23.5K	22K-26.5K
	Genx		CFM56 Family					
Mass Flow (lbs/sec)			10	810-968	677-792	1,025-1,065	638-710	816-876
Bypass Ratio				5.4-6	5.3-5.5	6.4-6.6	4.9-5	6-6.2
Dry Weight (lbs.)				5.3K	5.3K	9K	4.3K	5K
Length (in)				102.4	103.5	103	93	95.4
Applications	Boeing 787, Boeing 747-8	Airbus A380	A320neo, Comac C919	A320 family- A318/A319/A320 /A321	Boeing (737- 600/-700/- 800/-900/- 900ER/BBJ)	Airbus A340- 200 and A340- 300 aircraft	Boeing 737- 300/400/500	A320 family

	GE90-94B	GE90-115B	CF6-6	CF6-50	CF6-80A	CF6-80C2	CF6-80E1	CF34-10	CF34-8	CF34-3	CT7-2	CT7-6/6A	CT7-8	CT7-9
Thrust (lbs.)	94K	110K-115K			40k-72k				9.2k-20k					1.7k-2.8k
Category	GE 90 Family		CF6 Family					CF 34 Family			CT7 Family			
Bypass Ratio			5.76-5.92/5.89	4.24-4.4	4.59-4.66	5-5.31	5-5.1	5.1	5.1	6.2:1				
Max Diameter (in)	134	135	105	105	105	106	114	57	52-53.4	49	15.6	15.6	26	29
Dry Weight (lbs.)	16.644K	18.260K	8,176-8,966	8,966-9,047	8,760-8,776	9,480-9,860	11,225	3700	2,408-2,600	1,625 - 1,670	429-466	493	542	807
Length (in)	287	287	188	183	167	168	168	90-145.5	121.2-128	103	46	47	48.8	96
Applications	Boeing 777-200, Boeing 777-200 ER	Boeing 777-200LR, Boeing 777-300ER, Boeing 777 Fighter	DC-10-10	Airbus A300B, DC-10-15/-30, Boeing 747-300, KC-10, E-4	Airbus A310-200, Boeing 767-200	Airbus A300-600/R/F, A310 200/-300, Boeing 767/747, MD-11, CX Japanese Transport	Airbus A330-200/-300, A330 Tanker	ACAC ARJ21, EMBRAER 190/195, EMBRAER Challenger Lineage 1000	Bombardier CRJ700/900, Bombardier Challenger 850	Bombardier CRJ100/-200, Bombardier Challenger 850	B214ST, S-70C	AW101	S-92/H-92, Cormorant, NH90, MH-60K, VH-71	EADS CASA CN-235

Rolls Royce Trent Family

	Trent 970	Trent 970B	Trent 972	Trent 972B	Trent 977	Trent 977B	Trent 980-84	Trent 1000-A	Trent 1000-C
Static Thrust (lbf)	75,152	78,304	76,752	80,231	80,781	83,835	84,098	83,800	69,800
Basic Engine Weight (lb)	13,842	13,842	13,842	13,842	13,842	13,842	13,842	11,924	11,924
Thrust to Weight Ratio	5.4	5.6	5.5	5.8	5.8	6	6	5.4	5.9
Length (in)	179	179	179	179	179	179	179	160	160
Fan Diameter (in)	116	116	116	116	116	116	116	112	112
Entry Into Service	2007	TBA	TBA	TBA	TBA	TBA	TBA	2008	2008
Applications	Airbus A380-841	Airbus A380-841	Airbus A380-842	Airbus A380-842	Airbus A380-843F	Airbus A380-843F	Airbus A380-941	Boeing 787-8	Boeing 787-8,9

	Trent 1000-D	Trent 1000-E	Trent 1000-H	Trent 1000-J	Trent 1000-K	Trent XWB-75	Trent XWB-84	Trent XWB-93
Static Thrust (lbf)	69,800	53,200	58,000	73,800	73,800	75,000/ 79000	84,000	93,000
Basic Engine Weight (lb)	11,924	11,924	11,924	11,924	11,924	---	---	---
Thrust to Weight Ratio	5.9	4.5	4.9	6.2	6.2	---	---	---
Length (in)	160	160	160	160	160	---	---	---
Fan Diameter (in)	112	112	112	112	118	118	118	118
Entry Into Service	2008	2010	2008	2010	2010	2014	2013	2015
Applications	Boeing 787-8,9	Boeing 787-3	Boeing 787-3, 787-8	Boeing 787-9	Boeing 787-9	Airbus A350-800 XWB	Airbus A350-900 XWB	Airbus A350-1000 XWB

P&W PurePower PW1000G Family

	PW1215G/PW1	PW1521G/PW	PW1124G/PW1	PW1400G
	217G	1524G	127G/PW1133	
Thrust (lbs.)	15 -17K	21-23K	24-33K	24-33K
Noise (vs. stage 4)	-15 dB	-20 dB	-20 dB	-20 dB
Emissions-CO2 reduction per a/c (tonnes annually)	-2,700	-3,000	-3,600	-3,600
Emissions-NOx (margin to CAEP 6)	-50%	-55%	-55%	-55%
Fan diameter (inches)	56	73	81	81
Stage count	1-G-2-8-2-3	1-G-3-8-2-3	1-G-3-8-2-3	1-G-3-8-2-3
Applications	MRJ	CSeries	A320neo	MS-21
Entry into service	2014	2013	Late 2015	2016

P&W PurePower PW1000G Family

	PW1215G/PW12	PW1521G/PW1	PW1124G/PW11	PW1400G
	17G	524G	27G/PW1133G	
Thrust (lbs.)	15 -17K	21-23K	24-33K	24-33K
Noise (vs. stage 4)	-15 dB	-20 dB	-20 dB	-20 dB
Emissions-CO2 reduction per a/c (tonnes annually)	-2,700	-3,000	-3,600	-3,600
Emissions-NOx (margin to CAEP 6)	-50%	-55%	-55%	-55%
Fan diameter (inches)	56	73	81	81
Stage count	1-G-2-8-2-3	1-G-3-8-2-3	1-G-3-8-2-3	1-G-3-8-2-3
Applications	MRJ	CSeries	A320neo	MS-21
Entry into service	2014	2013	Late 2015	2016

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Hamilton Sundstrand is doing fairly well, but most of the revenue growth in 2010 and 2011 is being driven by its industrial assets (compressors, pumps) rather than the A&D units.

Exhibit 15: Y-o-Y change in revenues in Hamilton Sundstrand

%, unless otherwise stated

	1Q 11	2Q 11	3Q 11E	4Q 11E
Aero OE	5.0%	10.0%	12.0%	13.0%
Aero AM	12.5%	13.5%	4.9%	1.9%
o/w spares	20.0%	23.0%	10.0%	7.0%
o/w provisioning	-2.0%	-5.0%	-5.0%	-8.0%
Industrial	12.0%	20.0%	14.0%	14.0%
Military	-2.0%	-1.0%	-2.0%	-3.0%
o/w OE	-11.0%	-15.0%	-10.0%	-4.0%
o/w AM	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%	5.0%
Total change	9.2%	10.5%	7.0%	6.3%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

The benefit of Goodrich is that it will give UTX strong positions on existing and future aircraft platforms at both Airbus and Boeing.

Exhibit 16: GR positioning on key commercial aircraft platforms

\$ in millions, unless otherwise stated

Aircraft	\$M / aircraft	Description
B-737NG	0.90	wheels and brakes - landing gear
B-747-8	4.50	wheels and brakes - landing gear
B-767	1.50	
B-777	2.50	wheels and brakes - landing gear
B-787	3.50	No landing gear, mostly Nacelles
A-320 Family	1.50	Nacelles, thrust reversers
A-330	2.50	depends on engine selection, nacelles and actuator
A-340	2.50	depends on engine selection, nacelles and actuator
A-380	7.00	wheels and brakes - landing gear
A-350	3.50	

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

The deal will also make UTX the broadest product supplier in the aerospace industry; on top of UTX being one of the top 3 engine suppliers in the world, and a leading supplier of flight control systems, auxiliary power and engine control systems (in HS), GR's portfolio will bring a host of aerospace structure related products and aftermarket.


Acquiring a high growth, high quality company

Aside from the specific products within the GR portfolio, GR offers very attractive growth and returns metrics, which suits UTX given it is one of the highest quality companies within our coverage universe.

From a growth standpoint, we note below the 5-year CAGRs of the two companies on sales, op profit and EPS – GR is consistently higher than UTX.


Exhibit 17: 2006-2011 CAGRs

%, unless otherwise stated



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

GR's R&D / sales ratio is fairly high, implying high barriers to entry; Aerospace is also an industry where market shares tend to be fairly 'sticky'.

Exhibit 18: Average R&D / sales 2004-2010

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Looking at the three businesses inside GR, we note that they are all earning a double-digit operating margin, suggesting limited need for UTX to undertake any major turn-around or restructuring activities at any of the segments. We show below the EBIT bridges and operating margins for 2009 and 2010 for the 3 units and the total company. Incremental / decremental margins tend to be quite high, at around 30-40% in the last two years.

Exhibit 19: EBIT bridges and op margins at GR


\$ in millions, unless otherwise stated

2010	Actuation and Landing Systems	Nacelles and Interior Systems	Electronic Systems	Total
Start profit	266.9	515.3	276.4	1058.6
Volume / mix	-25	-33	49	-9
Price / cost	23	24	6	53
FX	8	-4	0	4
Ests for LT contracts	5	53	0	58
Restructuring	0	0	-5	-5
Other	-5	1	-2	-6
End profit	273.1	555.9	324.9	1153.9
Change in profit	6.2	40.6	48.5	95.3
EBIT margin	11.0%	23.8%	15.2%	16.6%
Total incremental margin	-19%	240%	16%	34%
2009	Actuation and Landing Systems	Nacelles and Interior Systems	Electronic Systems	Total
Start profit	300	647.5	268.8	1216.3
Volume / mix	-55	-144	-42	-241
Price / cost	100	95	53	248
FX	-9	7	0	-2
Ests for LT contracts	-30	-35	0	-65
Restructuring / pension	-39	-55	-23	-117
Other	0	0	20	19
End profit	266.9	515.3	276.4	1058.6
Change in profit	-33.1	-132.2	7.6	-157.7
EBIT margin	10.6%	22.2%	15.0%	15.8%
Total incremental margin	37%	82%	-6%	42%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

High aftermarket, low earnings cyclicality

Aftermarket revenues represent 43% of GR's revenues in the 1H11, against around 45% of total UTX sales today. High aftermarket content is a key reason why UTX tends to have fairly smooth earnings and cash flow, which are substantially less volatile than the earnings of our EE/MI sector.


Exhibit 20: 2009 EPS decline for the EE / MI sector

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

GR should therefore fit well with UTX's operational model; we show below for instance that GR saw only a limited drop in earnings during the recent downturn, and its free cash generation has been fairly smooth as well.

Exhibit 21: GR FCF


\$ in millions, unless otherwise stated



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 22: GR EPS

\$, unless otherwise stated




Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Focused acquisition, should be multiple enhancing

UTX has been linked in media reports this year (Bloomberg) with a number of other potential targets, such as Tyco. We think that buying a focused company such as GR is likely to prove more accretive to the valuation multiple that UTX trades at, than buying a low growth, large, diversified business such as Tyco.

Exhibit 23: Forward P/E multiples

x, unless otherwise stated



Source: Datastream

GR is a known quantity

Goodrich and the various aerospace assets at UTX will have come into frequent association in the course of doing business, and the CEO of UTX clearly is very familiar with GR given his aerospace background. As a most recent example, Goodrich was selected by Airbus to design the nacelle and thrust reversers for the P&W GTF engine for the A320 NEO aircraft. Goodrich already supplied the nacelle to the existing A320.

This should increase the chances that the integration of GR will prove successful, if the deal goes ahead, than if UTX was adding another 'leg' to its portfolio of businesses (as GE found in the last cycle in industries such as water).

Tactically sensible

Aside from longer-term considerations, we think the deal makes sense given:

- Deal should be earnings accretive in Year 1;
- UTX has a strong balance sheet;
- UTX has not done any major aerospace deals recently and so will be able to focus on integrating GR;
- Aerospace cycle should still have substantial upside left in it.

EPS accretion

We showed in the Investment Summary the accretion scenarios depending on synergy numbers and take-out price. We show below the 2012 earnings accretion for UTX assuming no synergies and a \$125 take-out price, and different sales growth and margin assumptions for GR next year; generally, we think the deal could be accretive to the tune of around 9% in this scenario (assuming the deal is all debt-financed).

Exhibit 24: 2012 EPS Sensitivity

USD, unless otherwise stated

		GR 2012 Sales Growth				
		4%	8%	12%	16%	20%
GR 2012	6.81					
	13.5%	6.60	6.64	6.67	6.70	6.74
	14.5%	6.67	6.70	6.74	6.78	6.81
	15.5%	6.73	6.77	6.81	6.85	6.89
	16.5%	6.80	6.84	6.88	6.92	6.96
Margin	17.5%	6.86	6.91	6.95	6.99	7.04

Source: Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 25: 2012 EPS Accretion Sensitivity

% unless otherwise stated

		GR 2012 Sales Growth				
		4%	8%	12%	16%	20%
GR 2012	6.87					
	13.5%	6%	6%	7%	7%	8%
	14.5%	7%	7%	8%	8%	9%
	15.5%	8%	8%	9%	9%	10%
	16.5%	9%	9%	10%	11%	11%
Margin	17.5%	10%	10%	11%	12%	12%


Source: Credit Suisse estimates

Balance sheet is cash-rich; deal can be debt-financed

We do not think that UTX needs to issue equity in order to finance an acquisition of GR. Assuming a take-out price of \$125, this would drive a net debt / EBITDA for UTX of around 1.6x. We note that this seems quite low, particularly given the relatively non-volatile nature of UTX's earnings and cash flow (and the same is true of GR).

Exhibit 26: UTX Net Debt


\$ in millions, unless otherwise stated



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 27: 2012 Net Debt to EBITDA

x, unless otherwise stated



Source: Credit Suisse estimates

UTX has been quiet on the deal front

As we show below, industrial M&A has been warming up in the past 12 months, and deals are still taking place even as the macro outlook has deteriorated. UTX has not undertaken a major deal since buying GE Security last year; we therefore think this mitigates the risk that an integration of GR is somehow compromised as management attention will not be focussed on it.

Exhibit 28: Global industrial M&A activity

x, unless otherwise stated


Announce Date	Acquiror	Target	EV/Trailing 12 Mo's			EV/NTM		
			Sales	EBITDA	EBITA or EBIT	Sales	EBITDA	EBITA or EBIT
12-Sep-11	Colfax Corp	Charter International	0.9	7.6	9.1	0.8	7.2	
2-Sep-11	Smiths Group	Power Holdings Inc				1.5	8.4	10.0
31-Aug-11	Cameron Intl	LeTourneau's Drilling Segment		11.0	14.4			
31-Aug-11	Timken	Drives LLC	0.9					
25-Aug-11	SPX Corp	ClydeUnion Pumps	2.6			1.7	12.0	
22-Aug-11	Electrolux	Compania Techno Industrial	1.2	7.4	8.0			
18-Aug-11	Cree	Ruud	2.6					
15-Aug-11	Spectris	Omega Engineering	2.8		12.0			
27-Jun-11	StanleyBlack&D	Niscayah	1.2	14.1		1.2	13.3	
15-Jun-11	Sensata	Sensor-NITE	2.4					
13-Jun-11	Honeywell	EMS Technologies	1.3	12.4		1.1	9.5	
9-Jun-11	Schneider	Leader Harvest	5.2	26.0	30.6	4.3	21.7	25.5
6-Jun-11	KDI	Dynacast	1.4	7.7	9.1	1.3	6.6	7.7
1-Jun-11	Schneider	Telvent	1.8	11.6	17.1	1.7	10.5	14.2
20-May-11	Toshiba	Landis & Gyr	1.4	10.7				
7-Apr-11	Sulzer	Cardo Flow	1.9	12.8				
29-Mar-11	GE	Converteam	2.4	14.9	16.5	1.9	11.4	13.4
13-Feb-11	GE	Well Support (John Wood)	3.0	16.9	22.2	2.5	14.0	17.5
7-Feb-11	DHR	BEC	1.9	8.9	15.0	1.8	8.0	13.9
13-Jan-11	GE	Lineage	1.2	8.0	8.7			
3-Jan-11	DOV	Harbison Fisher	2.1	10.1	15.5	2.5	8.9	13.4
22-Dec-10	DOV	Sound Solutions	2.6	9.3	17.8	2.4	8.1	16.1
16-Dec-10	Assa Abloy	Cardo	1.3	10.1	12.1	1.2	9.1	10.8
13-Dec-10	GE	Wellstream	3.0	20.4	28.4	2.3	13.3	16.3
15-Nov-10	CAT	BUCY	1.8	10.4				
22-Oct-10	GE	Clariant	5.8	42.0	59.0			
6-Oct-10	GE	Dresser	1.5	8.3	9.4			
27-Jul-10	Onex / Others	Tomkins PLC	1.2	11.2		1.1	7.8	
29-Jun-10	EMR	Chloride	3.1		22.2	2.4		20.7
21-Jun-10	ITT	Godwin Pumps of America	2.9			2.5		
Average			2.4	13.9	18.4	2.4	11.9	15.2

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Early in the cycle still for Commercial OE

GR's Commercial OE business comprises 35% of sales (1H11), and the company is well-positioned on key growth platforms like the Boeing 787 and the Airbus A350. The sharp expected ramp in production schedules at the major commercial aircraft OEMs should therefore offer substantial growth for this piece of the business for the medium term.

Exhibit 29: Commercial aircraft delivery schedule




Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Looking at the below exhibit suggests that while the revenue growth rate at GR is likely to be at a peak for this cycle, growth itself is likely to continue for some time.

Exhibit 30: Y-o-Y revenue growth at GR

%, unless otherwise stated




Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

In terms of share price performance, when we look at GR's performance relative to the S&P, we can see that its strongest period of outperformance came fairly late in the last industrial cycle.

Exhibit 31: Relative share price performance to the S&P

Rebased to 0, unless otherwise stated



Source: Datastream

Risks

Will engine OEMs desert the GR nacelle business?

One area where investors appear to be worried about revenue dis-synergies regarding a potential transaction, is around the Nacelles and Interiors business, which comprises around half of GR's profits. This is because the nacelle (the structure around the engine, and associated components) tends to be designed and developed independently of the aircraft frame, and of the aircraft engine. Hence, there might be some risk that other aircraft engine developers (GE, Rolls Royce) are more reluctant to work with the GR nacelle business if it is part of the same company that owns P&W (one of the top 3 engine developers globally).

We think this is a risk, but likely to be a fairly small one, and could even comprise something of an opportunity.

A key reason for our view is that Safran and GE, who are the dominant players in the commercial narrowbody aircraft engine market (via the CFM JV), appear to be gaining decent traction with their Nexcelle JV. As a reminder, the CFM International 50/50 JV between Safran (as it is called today, or Snecma historically) and GE was established in 1974. One of Safran's businesses is Aircelle (part of its Aircraft Equipment segment), which is one of the leading nacelle, thrust reverser and aerostructure providers globally (supplying nacelles for the Airbus A380 for example). Middle River Aircraft Systems (MRAS) is part of GE Aviation, and is a business which supplies thrust reversers and aerostructures. In July 2008 (at the Farnborough Air Show), GE Aviation (MRAS) and Safran (Aircelle) announced they would be establishing a nacelle JV (which came to be designated Nexcelle in 2009). Nexcelle is based in Ohio, with the President (Steve Walters) having previously been GE's director of Business Operations for the CM56 program.


The experience so far of Nexcelle is that it actually benefits from the relationships with the parents of its parent companies – GE and Safran. For instance, Nexcelle was selected as the nacelle developer for the LEAP-X1C integrated propulsion system for the COMAC C919 aircraft in China, and Nexcelle participates in CFM International's Program Review Meetings with COMAC. The MRAS parent of Nexcelle includes P&W among its customers for thrust reversers; it remains to be seen whether this will continue if UTX buys GR.

GR margins are set to peak soon?

GR's aftermarket sales growth rates are likely to peak now, with OE sales set to gain a greater share of the mix until the end of this decade (when the first 787s for example will start to require post-warranty servicing). This may mean that further gains in margins are tough to squeeze out, particularly given the expansion in operating margins that have already taken place (op margins were 11.5% in 2005, against 17.5% in 2011E).

While this is a risk, we note that:

- Further restructuring of the existing business may still be possible (GR announced it is closing its Marble Avenue landing gear facility in Cleveland, Ohio by the end of 2012, which will account for around \$37m in pre-tax charges, with \$15m coming in 2012). We show below that almost two thirds of GR's square footage is in the US, against around 50% of sales.

Exhibit 32: Split of GR manufacturing sg footage by region, 2010

Source: Company data

- Margins are still likely to remain above UTX average margins: Our A&D team do not expect GR's operating margins to contract, and they see a path for them moving to the 18-19% range, which is well above the overall UTX group EBIT margin of 14%.

The equity market might not like large deals?


The equity market tends to be more sceptical around big transactions when equity markets are volatile and the economic outlook is highly uncertain, which is the case today. We note that two other companies in our sector that have undertaken large deals (DHR and SPW) this year have seen their share prices seemingly suffer from this. However, we think that the relatively low degree of cyclical in GR's business model, its good top-line growth outlook (unlike BEC) and the fact that UTX's balance sheet would still not show much leverage even if the deal is all debt-financed (unlike SPW) should mean its stock price does not suffer too much if a deal is undertaken.

Defense risk

Defense comprises 32% of GR's 2010 sales, and clearly the outlook for US Defense spending is considerably dimmer now than it was in the prior cycle. However, our A&D analysts believe that the business should still be able to sustain some growth in the coming years, given its positioning in ISR products.

Exhibit 33: GR: Broad Defense Portfolio

x, unless otherwise stated



Source: Goodrich

What might UTX do next?

Looking at UTX's portfolio, if the GR revenues were to be combined with those of HS Aerospace revenues (\$4-5bn), would drive a total annual business size of \$12bn+. This would fit the CEO's stated ambition to have \$10bn revenue businesses within UTX.

The company would then be left with the industrial revenues inside HS, which comprise products such as compressors and pumps, and which have annual sales of around \$1.2bn, and a Fire & Security business which even after the GE deal, still has annual sales of only \$7bn this year, on our estimates. We think that, following any GR deal, UTX might then potentially sell off the industrial assets inside HS today, or else look to build them up into a 7th business unit, as well as continue to add to F&S revenues in order to bring them towards the \$10bn run-rate sales level.

We show below our product matrix for the construction sector to show where UTX currently plays; there is a chance that, as in aerospace, it seeks to diversify beyond its current positions within "the building".

Exhibit 34: Construction Matrix

Market Participants		Security Only	F + S	HVAC	Lighting	Low voltage	Elevators & Escalators	Water
North America	Acuity				X			
	Brac Systems							X
	Cooper		X		X	X		
	CREE				X			
	Eaton					X		
	Emerson			X				
	GE				X			
	Honeywell		X	X				
	Hubbell				X	X		
	Ingersoll-Rand	X		X				
	Johnson Controls			X				
	Lennox			X				
	Littlefuse					X		
	Stanley Black & Decker	X						
	Thomas & Betts			X	X	X		
	Tyco		X					
	UTC		X	X			X	
Europe	ABB	X	X	X	X	X		X
	Assa Abloy	X						
	Danfoss			X				
	Dialight				X			
	Geberit							X
	Kaba	X						
	Kone						X	
	Legrand					X		
	Philips				X			
	Schindler						X	
	Schneider					X		
	Siemens		X		X	X		
	Thyssen Krupp						X	
	Uponor							X
	Veolia							X
	Wavin							X
	Zumtobel				X			
Asia	Daikin			X				
	Secom	X						

Source: Company data

Valuation

We show below our target price methodology for UTX.

Exhibit 35: Target Price Derivation

USD, unless otherwise stated

Valuation Method	Price	Assumptions
HOLT	90	18% CFROI
SOTP	88	-
DCF	91	4% growth, 13.5% OM, WACC 8.8%
EV/EBIT	92	9.6x EV/EBIT
P/E	91	14.5x P/E
Average	91	Blended average

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

We show our SOTP for UTX below.

Exhibit 36: SOTP

\$ in millions, unless otherwise stated

2012E	Sales	Adj. EBIT	Margin	EV/Sales Base case	EV/EBIT Base case	EV \$bn Base case
Otis	13,643	3,141	23.0%	2.4	10.6	33,338
Carrier	13,423	1,730	12.9%	1.2	9.2	15,884
Fire & Security	7,529	1,053	14.0%	1.3	9.5	10,025
Pratt & Whitney	14,753	2,260	15.3%	1.2	7.6	17,222
Industrial	1,219	244	20.0%	1.5	7.7	1,869
Aerospace	5,106	924	18.1%	1.5	8.3	7,624
Hamilton Sundstrand	6,325	1,168	18.5%	1.5	8.1	9,493
Sikorsky	7,434	865	11.6%	1.0	8.7	7,479
Total Segment	63,107	10,217	16.2%	1.5	9.1	93,441
Eliminations	0	(717)		NM	9.0	(6,416)
Total consolidated	63,107	9,500	15.1%	1.4	9.2	87,025
Net debt						3,706
Other EV adjustments						4,174
Market cap						79,145
NOSH						895
Share price						88

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

In terms of the 3-scenario analysis (which we stick with given the ongoing macro volatility), we note that UTX offers below-average downside in our bear scenario, and looks near fair value in a low growth environment. An acquisition of GR should enhance its growth profile, and the valuation multiple that investors ascribe to it.

Exhibit 37: Scenario Up/Downside Summary and Valuation


Upside/Downside		CBE	DHR	DOV	EMR	GDI	GE	HON	IR	KMT	ROK	SPW	TXT	TYC	UTX	VMI	EE/MI
Upside / Downside																	
Base Scenario		35%	15%	25%	22%	9%	29%	29%	32%	30%	50%	51%	36%	12%	13%	21%	27%
Low-Growth Scenario		11%	-7%	5%	5%	-9%	2%	4%	-3%	2%	10%	14%	-8%	-13%	-6%	-12%	0%
Bear Scenario		-20%	-28%	-31%	-20%	-37%	-22%	-26%	-42%	-40%	-39%	-29%	-62%	-29%	-22%	-36%	-32%
Base : Low-Growth Ratio		3.3	(2.0)	5.2	4.6	(1.0)	12.4	8.3	(12.6)	14.6	4.9	3.6	(4.3)	(1.0)	(2.2)	(1.8)	2.1
Low-Growth : Bear Ratio		0.5	(0.3)	0.2	0.2	(0.2)	0.1	0.1	(0.1)	0.1	0.3	0.5	(0.1)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.3)	0.0
Base : Bear Ratio		1.7	0.5	0.8	1.1	0.3	1.3	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.3	1.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.9
Assumptions		CBE	DHR	DOV	EMR	GDI	GE	HON	IR	KMT	ROK	SPW	TXT	TYC	UTX	VMI	EE/MI
Target P/E Multiple																	
Base Scenario		14.0x	16.2x	13.0x	14.9x	13.7x	13.4x	13.4x	13.0x	13.0x	16.4x	14.3x	13.0x	12.5x	13.6x	16.1x	14.0x
Low-Growth Scenario		12.5x	14.7x	11.9x	13.9x	12.6x	11.7x	11.9x	11.5x	11.5x	14.0x	12.1x	11.6x	11.2x	12.6x	13.6x	12.5x
Bear Scenario		10.5x	13.2x	11.0x	13.0x	11.6x	10.0x	10.5x	10.0x	11.0x	12.0x	10.0x	10.5x	10.0x	11.5x	11.0x	11.1x
Implied EV/Sales Multiple																	
Base Scenario		1.7x	2.2x	1.4x	1.7x	1.4x	1.5x *	1.4x	1.2x	1.4x	2.3x	0.8x	0.6x *	1.3x	1.4x	1.1x	1.42x
Low-Growth Scenario		1.4x	2.0x	1.2x	1.5x	1.2x	1.2x *	1.2x	0.9x	1.2x	1.9x	0.6x	0.4x *	1.1x	1.2x	0.9x	1.20x
Bear Scenario		1.2x	2.0x	1.0x	1.4x	0.9x	1.0x *	1.0x	0.7x	0.9x	1.5x	0.5x	0.2x *	1.0x	1.2x	0.7x	1.01x
*MV/Sales																	
Implied EV/EBIT Multiple																	
Base Scenario		10.8x	13.0x	8.9x	9.6x	8.0x	9.9x *	10.3x	10.0x	9.5x	14.3x	9.7x	7.2x *	10.0x	9.4x	10.4x	10.2x
Low-Growth Scenario		9.6x	12.1x	8.1x	9.0x	7.1x	8.6x *	9.4x	9.0x	8.7x	12.8x	8.5x	6.1x *	9.1x	8.8x	8.8x	9.2x
Bear Scenario		8.8x	12.2x	7.5x	8.3x	6.1x	7.8x *	8.9x	8.5x	7.9x	12.8x	8.0x	4.3x *	8.6x	8.4x	5.7x	8.4x
*MV/EBIT																	
P/E Fair Value (\$)																	
Base Scenario		61	53	66	56	84	21	61	47	47	89	80	25	49	85	111	
Low-Growth Scenario		50	43	55	48	70	17	49	35	37	66	61	17	38	71	81	
Bear Scenario		36	33	36	36	48	13	35	21	22	36	38	7	32	59	59	
Current Price (\$)		45	46	52	46	76	16	47	36	36	59	53	19	44	76	92	
Current Valuation		CBE	DHR	DOV	EMR	GDI	GE	HON	IR	KMT	ROK	SPW	TXT	TYC	UTX	VMI	EE/MI
Current																	
Price (\$)		\$45	\$46	\$52	\$46	\$76	\$16	\$47	\$36	\$36	\$59	\$53	\$19	\$44	\$76	\$92	
EV (bn)		\$7.5	\$36.3	\$11.2	\$38.3	\$3.3	\$170.9 *	\$42.8	\$13.4	\$3.0	\$8.7	\$3.2	\$4.6 *	\$22.2	\$78.5	\$4.3	
Dividend Yield		2.5%	0.2%	2.2%	2.9%	0.3%	3.7%	2.8%	1.5%	1.3%	2.8%	1.8%	0.5%	2.4%	2.6%	2.5%	2.0%
2012 FCF Yield		8.6%	14.8%	8.4%	8.9%	9.4%		11.1%	13.2%	9.3%	7.9%	11.0%		12.6%	9.2%	8.6%	10.2%
*MV																	
2012 P/E																	
Base Scenario		10.4x	14.2x	10.4x	12.1x	12.5x	10.3x	10.4x	9.9x	10.0x	10.9x	9.5x	9.6x	11.1x	12.1x	13.3x	11.1x
Low-Growth Scenario		11.3x	15.9x	11.4x	13.3x	13.9x	11.4x	11.5x	11.8x	11.3x	12.7x	10.6x	12.6x	12.9x	13.4x	15.3x	12.6x
Bear Scenario		13.1x	18.3x	16.0x	16.3x	18.3x	12.9x	14.2x	17.4x	18.2x	19.7x	14.0x	27.7x	13.7x	14.7x	17.2x	16.8x
2012 EV/EBIT																	
Base Scenario		8.5x	10.9x	7.6x	8.1x	7.4x	7.6x *	8.1x	7.5x	7.2x	8.0x	6.7x	4.8x *	9.1x	8.4x	14.2x	8.3x
Low-Growth Scenario		9.3x	12.2x	8.3x	8.7x	8.2x	8.4x *	9.0x	8.8x	8.4x	9.3x	7.4x	6.0x *	10.4x	9.1x	16.1x	9.3x
Bear Scenario		11.7x	15.1x	11.4x	10.3x	11.4x	10.0x *	11.4x	12.5x	12.6x	14.4x	10.2x	10.3x *	11.5x	10.2x	13.8x	11.8x
*MV/EBIT																	
2012 EV/Sales																	
Base Scenario		1.31x	1.86x	1.16x	1.42x	1.30x	1.1x *	1.08x	0.87x	1.10x	1.31x	0.54x	0.4x *	1.21x	1.24x	1.55x	1.16x
Low-Growth Scenario		1.35x	2.01x	1.24x	1.49x	1.38x	1.1x *	1.12x	0.88x	1.15x	1.37x	0.57x	0.4x *	1.24x	1.29x	1.63x	1.22x
Bear Scenario		1.59x	2.44x	1.58x	1.72x	1.66x	1.2x *	1.29x	0.99x	1.42x	1.70x	0.64x	0.5x *	1.32x	1.40x	1.79x	1.42x
*MV/Sales																	
Scenarios		CBE	DHR	DOV	EMR	GDI	GE	HON	IR	KMT	ROK	SPW	TXT	TYC	UTX	VMI	EE/MI
2012 Base Scenario	2012 Sales (bn)	5.8	19.5	9.6	26.9	2.6	151.4	39.6	15.4	2.8	6.7	6.1	12.3	18.4	63.1	2.8	
	YoY%	8%	20%	12%	8%	10%	3%	7%	2%	9%	10%	9%	8%	5%	7%	9%	8%
	2012 EBIT (bn)	0.9	3.3	1.5	4.7	0.5	22.3	5.2	1.8	0.4	1.1	0.5	1.0	2.4	9.4	0.3	
	Margin	15.3%	17.0%	15.2%	17.6%	17.5%	14.8%	13.3%	11.5%	15.3%	16.2%	8.0%	7.8%	13.3%	14.9%	10.9%	13.9%
	Incremental	27%	20%	17%	20%	21%	37%	24%	34%	25%	24%	22%	33%	31%	26%	23%	26%
	Tax Rate	22%	26%	28%	31%	28%	26%	26%	24%	24%	23%	32%	31%	20%	31%	34%	27%
	2012 EPS	\$4.33	\$3.25	\$5.05	\$3.77	\$6.11	\$1.58	\$4.55	\$3.61	\$3.59	\$5.43	\$5.62	\$1.95	\$3.94	\$6.26	\$6.90	
2012 Low-Growth Scenario	YoY%	14%	17%	9%	13%	14%	16%	13%	25%	10%	13%	30%	101%	15%	14%	18%	21%
	2012 Sales (bn)	5.6	18.0	9.0	25.7	2.4	149.2	38.1	15.2	2.6	6.3	5.7	11.6	17.9	60.9	2.7	
	YoY%	5%	12%	6%	4%	5%	1%	4%	1%	5%	6%	4%	2%	2%	3%	4%	4%
	2012 EBIT (bn)	0.8	3.0	1.3	4.4	0.4	20.3	4.8	1.5	0.4	0.9	0.4	0.8	2.1	8.6	0.3	
	Margin	14.6%	16.5%	14.9%	17.0%	16.7%	13.6%	12.5%	10.0%	13.8%	14.8%	7.6%	6.7%	11.8%	14.1%	10.1%	13.0%
	Incremental	20%	20%	15%	15%	20%	30%	20%	20%	22%	20%	15%	15%	20%	20%	20%	19%
	Tax Rate	22.0%	26.0%	28.0%	30.5%	28.0%	26.0%	26.0%	24.0%	20.0%	22.5%	32.0%	31.0%	19.8%	31.0%	34.0%	27%
2012 Bear Scenario	2012 EPS	\$3.98	\$2.89	\$4.61	\$3.44	\$5.51	\$1.43	\$4.09	\$3.02	\$3.19	\$4.68	\$5.00	\$1.47	\$3.39	\$5.64	\$5.97	
	YoY%	6%	7%	1%	6%	8%	12%	5%	11%	6%	5%	5%	29%	7%	6%	6%	8%
	2012 Sales (bn)	4.7	14.8	7.1	22.2	2.0	138.6	33.1	13.6	2.1	5.1	5.1	10.2	16.8	56.0	2.4	
	YoY%	-11%	-8%	-17%	-10%	-13%	-6%	-10%	-10%	-15%	-15%	-8%	-10%	-4%	-5%	-5%	-10%
	2012 EBIT (bn)	0.6	2.4	1.0	3.7	0.3	17.1	3.8	1.1	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.5	1.9	7.7	0.3	
	Margin	13.6%	16.2%	13.9%	16.8%	14.6%	12.3%	11.4%	7.9%	11.3%	11.8%	6.3%	4.4%	11.5%	13.7%	13.0%	11.9%
	Decremental	20%	15%	20%	20%	30%	30%	20%	28%	25%	30%	20%	25%	16%	17%	13%	22%
2009 Downturn	Tax Rate	15.0%	19.0%	27.0%	28.0%	24.0%	22.0%	22.6%	14.0%	22.0%	19.0%	25.0%	30.0%	16.0%	29.0%	30.0%	23%
	2012 EPS	\$3.44	\$2.51	\$3.28	\$2.80	\$4.17	\$1.27	\$3.33	\$2.06	\$1.97	\$3.02	\$3.79	\$0.67	\$3.19	\$5.12	\$5.31	
	YoY%	-8%	-9%	-29%	-16%	-22%	-7%	-17%	-29%	-40%	-37%	-12%	-31%	-7%	-6%	-9%	-19%
	2009 Sales (bn)	5.1	10.8	5.8	3.1	1.8	155.3	30.9	13.1	1.9	4.5	4.8	10.5	1.6	52.4	2.0	
	YoY% (Organic +FX)	-23%	-14%	-26%	-16%	-27%	-12%	-16%	-22%	-24%	-17%	-25%	-13%	-7%	-9%	-18%	
	2009 EBIT (bn)	0.6	1.5	0.6	0.5	0.2	10.0	2.5	1.0	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	6.4	0.2	
	Margin	11.3%	13.7%	10.2%	15.9%	10.9%	6.4%	7.9%	7.4%	0.5%	9.0%	3.5%	1.5%	9.7%	12.2%	9.0%	8.6%
2009 Downturn	Decremental	25%	21%	25%	20%	40%	34%	19%	na	49%	38%	19%	25%	15%	19%	na	27%
	2009 EPS	\$2.68	\$1.71	\$1.84	\$2.36	\$2.40	\$1.00	\$2.69	\$1.65	\$0.95	\$1.91	\$3.92	\$0.38	\$2.47	\$4.12	\$3.57	
	YoY%	-31%	-16%	-50%	-19%	-32%	-44%	-28%	-57%	-47%	-42%	-40%	-86%	-15%	-16%	-38%	-37%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

When we look at the performance of UTX relative to the S&P in this downturn compared with 2008-9, we can see that it had recently fallen almost to the trough level of relative performance which it hit in that downturn. This suggests that further relative downside is limited, even if the industrial cycle deteriorates further.

Exhibit 38: UTX relative to the S&P

% performance, in days, unless otherwise stated



Source: Datastream

Summary Financials

Exhibit 39: UTX Income Statement

USD in millions, unless otherwise stated

Income statement	2008	2009	2010	2011E	2012E	2013E
Sales	59,757	52,425	54,326	59,163	63,107	66,665
change	7%	-12%	4%	9%	7%	6%
Operating profit	7,625	6,377	7,186	8,369	9,390	10,252
margin	12.8%	12.2%	13.2%	14.1%	14.9%	15.4%
Other expenses	0	0	0	0	0	0
Interest	(689)	(617)	(648)	(592)	(596)	(592)
PTP	6,936	5,760	6,538	7,777	8,795	9,661
margin	11.6%	11.0%	12.0%	13.1%	13.9%	14.5%
Tax charge	(1,883)	(1,581)	(1,827)	(2,388)	(2,726)	(2,946)
Tax rate	27.1%	27.4%	27.9%	30.7%	31.0%	30.5%
Minority interest	(364)	(350)	(338)	(400)	(415)	(415)
Net income from cont. ops	4,689	3,829	4,373	4,989	5,653	6,299
Discontinued operations	1	2	3	4	5	5
Net income	4,689	3,829	4,373	4,989	5,653	6,299
margin	7.8%	7.3%	8.0%	8.4%	9.0%	9.4%
Diluted EPS - cont ops	\$4.90	\$4.12	\$4.74	\$5.48	\$6.26	\$7.03
change	15%	-16%	15%	16%	14%	12%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 40: UTX Balance Sheet

USD in millions, unless otherwise stated

Balance sheet	2008	2009	2010	2011E	2012E	2013E
Cash	4,327	4,449	4,083	2,707	6,304	10,358
Other current assets	19,772	18,745	19,427	22,647	24,049	25,313
Total current assets	24,099	23,194	23,510	25,354	30,353	35,671
PP&E	6,348	6,364	6,280	6,371	6,511	6,654
Goodwill	18,806	19,836	21,781	21,466	21,151	20,836
Other LT assets	7,216	6,368	6,922	6,922	6,922	6,922
LT assets	32,370	32,568	34,983	34,759	34,584	34,412
Total assets	56,469	55,762	58,493	60,114	64,937	70,084
ST debt	2,139	1,487	279	0	0	0
Other current liabilities	17,295	16,426	17,453	18,662	19,906	21,029
Current liabilities	19,434	17,913	17,732	18,662	19,906	21,029
LT debt	9,337	8,257	10,010	10,010	10,010	10,010
Other LT liabilities	11,781	9,526	9,366	8,879	8,893	8,906
LT liabilities	21,118	17,783	19,376	18,889	18,903	18,916
Total liabilities	40,552	35,696	37,108	37,551	38,809	39,945
Shareholders' Equity	15,917	20,066	21,385	22,562	26,128	30,139
Total liabilities and S/E	56,469	55,762	58,493	60,114	64,937	70,084

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 41: UTX Cash Flow Statement*USD in millions, unless otherwise stated*


Cash flow	2008	2009	2010	2011E	2012E	2013E
Net income	4,689	3,829	4,373	4,989	5,653	6,299
D&A	1,321	1,258	1,356	1,228	1,248	1,269
Change in working capital	(276)	582	571	(2,011)	(157)	(142)
Other cash flow from operations	427	(316)	(394)	(100)	415	415
Cash flow from operations	6,161	5,353	5,906	4,106	7,159	7,841
Capex	(1,216)	(826)	(865)	(1,004)	(1,073)	(1,097)
cash flow from investments	(1,120)	(278)	(2,322)	(0)	(0)	0
Total from investments	(2,336)	(1,104)	(3,187)	(1,004)	(1,073)	(1,097)
Cash flow from financing	(2,238)	(4,191)	(3,153)	(4,478)	(2,489)	(2,690)
Effect of FX	(164)	64	68	0	0	0
Total cash flow	1,423	122	(366)	(1,376)	3,597	4,054

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 42: UTX Divisional Summary*USD in millions, unless otherwise stated*

Divisional summary	2008	2009	2010	2011E	2012E	2013E
Revenues						
Otis	12,949	11,723	11,579	12,593	13,643	14,565
Carrier	14,944	11,335	11,386	12,468	13,423	14,204
UTC Fire & Security	6,462	5,503	6,490	7,075	7,529	7,926
Pratt & Whitney	13,709	12,392	12,935	13,795	14,753	15,925
Hamilton Sundstrand	6,207	5,560	5,608	6,050	6,325	6,499
Sikorsky	5,368	6,287	6,684	7,182	7,434	7,546
Total segment revenues	59,639	52,800	54,682	59,163	63,107	66,665
Eliminations & other	(214)	(375)	(356)	-	-	-
Consolidated revenues	59,425	52,425	54,326	59,163	63,107	66,665
Reported revenue growth						
Otis	9.0%	-9.5%	-1.2%	8.8%	8.3%	6.8%
Carrier	2.0%	-24.2%	0.4%	9.5%	7.7%	5.8%
UTC Fire & Security	12.3%	-14.8%	17.9%	9.0%	6.4%	5.3%
Pratt & Whitney	5.1%	-9.6%	4.4%	6.6%	6.9%	7.9%
Hamilton Sundstrand	10.1%	-10.4%	0.9%	7.9%	4.5%	2.8%
Sikorsky	12.1%	17.1%	6.3%	7.5%	3.5%	1.5%
Total segment revenues	7.0%	-11.5%	3.6%	8.2%	6.7%	5.6%
Eliminations & other	174.4%	75.2%	-5.1%	-100.0%	-	-
Consolidated revenues	6.7%	-11.8%	3.6%	8.9%	6.7%	5.6%
Adjusted operating profit						
Otis	2,498	2,553	2,658	2,890	3,141	3,364
Carrier	1,389	866	1,142	1,489	1,730	1,922
UTC Fire & Security	605	605	792	929	1,053	1,163
Pratt & Whitney	2,201	2,025	2,125	2,037	2,260	2,483
Hamilton Sundstrand	1,090	945	983	1,095	1,168	1,215
Sikorsky	478	615	730	828	865	908
Segment adj OP	8,261	7,609	8,430	9,270	10,217	11,054
Eliminations & other	(50)	(144)	(253)	(360)	(275)	(225)
General corporate	(408)	(345)	(377)	(414)	(442)	(467)
Adjusted operating profit	7,803	7,120	7,800	8,496	9,500	10,362
Adj operating margin						
Otis	19.3%	21.8%	23.0%	23.0%	23.0%	23.1%
Carrier	9.3%	7.6%	10.0%	11.9%	12.9%	13.5%
UTC Fire & Security	9.4%	11.0%	12.2%	13.1%	14.0%	14.7%
Pratt & Whitney	16.1%	16.3%	16.4%	14.8%	15.3%	15.6%
Hamilton Sundstrand	17.6%	17.0%	17.5%	18.1%	18.5%	18.7%
Sikorsky	8.9%	9.8%	10.9%	11.5%	11.6%	12.0%
Total segment	13.9%	14.4%	15.4%	15.7%	16.2%	16.6%
Eliminations & other	-0.1%	-0.3%	-0.5%	-0.6%	-0.4%	-0.3%
General corporate	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.7%	-0.7%
Adjusted operating margin	13.1%	13.6%	14.4%	14.4%	15.1%	15.5%

Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Exhibit 43: UTX Company Summary
USD in millions, unless otherwise stated


Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Companies Mentioned (Price as of 16 Sep 11)

Cooper Industries PLC (CBE, \$47.65, OUTPERFORM, TP \$62.00)
 Danaher Corporation (DHR, \$45.94, NEUTRAL, TP \$52.00)
 Dover Corporation (DOV, \$52.34, NEUTRAL, TP \$69.00)
 Emerson (EMR, \$45.74, OUTPERFORM, TP \$59.00)
 Gardner Denver, Inc. (GDI, \$76.41, NEUTRAL, TP \$91.00)
 General Electric (GE, \$16.33, OUTPERFORM, TP \$22.00)
 Goodrich (GR, \$92.89, OUTPERFORM, TP \$117.00)
 Honeywell International Inc. (HON, \$47.13, NEUTRAL, TP \$59.00)
 Ingersoll-Rand Plc (IR, \$35.70, OUTPERFORM, TP \$48.00)
 Kennametal Inc. (KMT, \$35.92, OUTPERFORM, TP \$43.00)
 Rockwell Automation (ROK, \$59.49, OUTPERFORM, TP \$86.00)
 Rockwell Collins, Inc. (COL, \$56.21, OUTPERFORM, TP \$66.00)
 SPX Corporation (SPW, \$53.16, OUTPERFORM, TP \$86.00)
 Textron (TXT, \$18.63, NEUTRAL, TP \$25.00)
 Tyco International, Ltd (TYC, \$43.70, NEUTRAL, TP \$46.00)
 United Technologies Corp (UTX, \$75.50, OUTPERFORM, TP \$91.00)
 Valmont Industries (VMI, \$91.55, NEUTRAL, TP \$103.00)

Disclosure Appendix


Important Global Disclosures

I, Julian Mitchell, certify that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect my personal views about all of the subject companies and securities and (2) no part of my compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this report.

See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names.


3-Year Price, Target Price and Rating Change History Chart for GE

GE Date	Closing Price (US\$)	Target Price (US\$)	Initiation/ Rating Assumption
9/25/08	25.68	26	
9/26/08	25.25	25	
10/1/08	24.5		R
10/2/08	22.15	23	N
10/10/08	21.5	21	
12/3/08	18.13	18	
12/17/08	17.39	17	
1/22/09	13.48	15	
1/26/09	12.42	13	
3/19/09	10.13	11	
4/19/09	11.35	12	
5/4/09	13.1		NC
5/10/10	18.04	23	O X
7/19/10	14.62	22	
1/24/11	20.04	23	
8/4/11	16.47	22	




3-Year Price, Target Price and Rating Change History Chart for GR

GR	Closing Price	Target Price	Initiation/
Date	(US\$)	(US\$)	Rating Assumption
10/16/08	33.19	52	
2/4/09	39.16	50	
4/23/09	46.02	52	
7/16/09	51.85	59	
10/12/09	54.83	65	
10/22/09	58.57	69	
1/8/10	66.21	79	
1/28/10	61.37	76	
4/12/10	72.04	77	
4/22/10	76.51	84	
7/14/10	69.22	77	
7/29/10	72.95	80	
10/12/10	76.42	85	
12/20/10	87.31	100	
7/21/11	98.99	117	




3-Year Price, Target Price and Rating Change History Chart for COL

COL	Closing Price	Target Price	Initiation/
Date	(US\$)	(US\$)	Rating Assumption
10/16/08	37.38	43	
11/21/08	30.39	42	
2/4/09	37.64	40	
4/28/09	37.3	38	
7/16/09	41.31	41	
7/30/09	42.52	39	
9/17/09	50.58	47	
1/8/10	57.39	55	
4/12/10	64.2	60	
4/23/10	65.9	73	
9/16/10	57.91	72	
1/21/11	63.71	85	O
7/22/11	57.41	74	
9/15/11	52.14	66	




3-Year Price, Target Price and Rating Change History Chart for TXT

TXT	Closing Price	Target Price	Initiation/
Date	(US\$)	(US\$)	Rating Assumption
9/25/08	33.52	43	
10/17/08	19.12	25	
11/20/08	11.95	18	
1/30/09	9.03	13	
4/29/09	10.81		R
4/30/09	10.73		N
5/4/09	11.22		NC
9/28/10	20.88	24	N
1/4/11	23.75	26	
4/20/11	25.51	27	
8/4/11	19	25	



3-Year Price, Target Price and Rating Change History Chart for UTX

UTX	Closing Price (US\$)	Target Price (US\$)	Initiation/ Rating	Assumption
Date				
9/25/08	59.17	68		
10/17/08	50.71	63		
11/20/08	43.22	51		
12/12/08	48.82	54		
3/15/09	41.12	47		
4/21/09	47.99	54		
5/4/09	51.18		NC	
5/10/10	73.04	93	O	X
7/26/10	71.59	90		
1/4/11	79.12	92		
4/20/11	85.9	94		
8/4/11	74.37	91		



The analyst(s) responsible for preparing this research report received compensation that is based upon various factors including Credit Suisse's total revenues, a portion of which are generated by Credit Suisse's investment banking activities.

Analysts' stock ratings are defined as follows:

Outperform (O): The stock's total return is expected to outperform the relevant benchmark* by at least 10-15% (or more, depending on perceived risk) over the next 12 months.

Neutral (N): The stock's total return is expected to be in line with the relevant benchmark* (range of $\pm 10-15\%$) over the next 12 months.

Underperform (U): The stock's total return is expected to underperform the relevant benchmark* by 10-15% or more over the next 12 months.

*Relevant benchmark by region: As of 29th May 2009, Australia, New Zealand, U.S. and Canadian ratings are based on (1) a stock's absolute total return potential to its current share price and (2) the relative attractiveness of a stock's total return potential within an analyst's coverage universe**, with Outperforms representing the most attractive, Neutrals the less attractive, and Underperforms the least attractive investment opportunities. Some U.S. and Canadian ratings may fall outside the absolute total return ranges defined above, depending on market conditions and industry factors. For Latin American, Japanese, and non-Japan Asia stocks, ratings are based on a stock's total return relative to the average total return of the relevant country or regional benchmark; for European stocks, ratings are based on a stock's total return relative to the analyst's coverage universe**. For Australian and New Zealand stocks, 12-month rolling yield is incorporated in the absolute total return calculation and a 15% and a 7.5% threshold replace the 10-15% level in the Outperform and Underperform stock rating definitions, respectively. The 15% and 7.5% thresholds replace the +10-15% and -10-15% levels in the Neutral stock rating definition, respectively.

**An analyst's coverage universe consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector.

Restricted (R): In certain circumstances, Credit Suisse policy and/or applicable law and regulations preclude certain types of communications, including an investment recommendation, during the course of Credit Suisse's engagement in an investment banking transaction and in certain other circumstances.

Volatility Indicator [V]: A stock is defined as volatile if the stock price has moved up or down by 20% or more in a month in at least 8 of the past 24 months or the analyst expects significant volatility going forward.

Analysts' coverage universe weightings are distinct from analysts' stock ratings and are based on the expected performance of an analyst's coverage universe* versus the relevant broad market benchmark:**

Overweight: Industry expected to outperform the relevant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months.

Market Weight: Industry expected to perform in-line with the relevant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months.

Underweight: Industry expected to underperform the relevant broad market benchmark over the next 12 months.

*An analyst's coverage universe consists of all companies covered by the analyst within the relevant sector.

**The broad market benchmark is based on the expected return of the local market index (e.g., the S&P 500 in the U.S.) over the next 12 months.

Credit Suisse's distribution of stock ratings (and banking clients) is:

Global Ratings Distribution		
Outperform/Buy*	49%	(61% banking clients)
Neutral/Hold*	39%	(56% banking clients)
Underperform/Sell*	9%	(53% banking clients)
Restricted	2%	

*For purposes of the NYSE and NASD ratings distribution disclosure requirements, our stock ratings of Outperform, Neutral, and Underperform most closely correspond to Buy, Hold, and Sell, respectively; however, the meanings are not the same, as our stock ratings are determined on a relative basis. (Please refer to definitions above.) An investor's decision to buy or sell a security should be based on investment objectives, current holdings, and other individual factors.

Credit Suisse's policy is to update research reports as it deems appropriate, based on developments with the subject company, the sector or the market that may have a material impact on the research views or opinions stated herein.

Credit Suisse's policy is only to publish investment research that is impartial, independent, clear, fair and not misleading. For more detail please refer to Credit Suisse's Policies for Managing Conflicts of Interest in connection with Investment Research: http://www.csfb.com/research-and-analytics/disclaimer/managing_conflicts_disclaimer.html

Credit Suisse does not provide any tax advice. Any statement herein regarding any US federal tax is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by any taxpayer for the purposes of avoiding any penalties.

See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names.

Price Target: (12 months) for (GE)

Method: Our \$22 target price for GE represents 13.9x our 2012 eps estimate. On HOLT, using 15% CFROI, GE is worth \$24. On SOTP GE is worth \$21. On EV/EBIT, GE is worth \$22. On P/E, we think GE is worth \$22. Our \$22TP is a blended average of our various valuation methods.

Risks: Risks to our \$22 target price for GE are (1) a slower than expected recovery for its Industrial businesses, which could pressure earnings; (2) overpaying for deals in the Medical segment, which was a problem in the last upcycle; (3) additional losses in GE Capital, including the potential for additional claims associated with its sale of GE Money Japan through GE's loss sharing agreement; (4) lack of cost control in its Industrial businesses could reduce incremental margins; (5) a prolonged downturn in the thermal power generation market; and (6) corporate costs volatility.

Price Target: (12 months) for (GR)

Method: A multiple of 12.5x expected peak earnings in 2015 of \$9.34 yields a target price of \$117.

Risks: Risks to our \$117 target price for GR include a stall in the commercial original equipment upcycle, a decline in aftermarket activity, potential overhang from failure to repair actuation system for the Airbus A380, raw material price increases and availability, and delays on 777 landing gear production at GR.

Price Target: (12 months) for (COL)

Method: We apply a 10% discount to the historical FY2 multiple (5 year average) of 15.5x to our CY'12 estimate of \$4.69 to yield a \$66 target price for COL. The discount is to account for a more uncertain defense environment.

Risks: Risks to our \$66 target price for COL are inability to sustain profit margin, a decline in defense spending, contract cancellations and a stalled airline and business jet recovery, a major interruption in the commercial aerospace industry, nonperformance on government contracts and product liability, as well as further increases in the cost of oil, which impacts many of its customers.

Price Target: (12 months) for (TXT)

Method: Our \$25 target price on TXT represents 15.1x our 2012 eps estimate.

Risks: Risks to our \$25 target price for TXT are: (1) a further decline in business jet deliveries caused by a delay in the recovery of the business jet cycle; (2) Industrial margins reverting to trough levels or worse, occasioned by a slowdown in automotive production; and (3) US Department of Defense budget cuts having an adverse effect on key TXT programs such as V22 or H1.

Price Target: (12 months) for (UTX)

Method: Our \$91 target price for UTX represents 14.5x our 2012 EPS estimate.

Risks: Risks to our \$91 target price for UTX include (1) a prolonged delay in the recovery of U.S. residential and commercial construction, which would have a negative impact on Fire and Security; (2) Otis margins are under pressure from competitors, although we believe its large installed base and substantial global presence means the company will be able to protect its profitability; and (3) an extended downturn in global commercial aerospace and risks associated with managing R&D programs.

Please refer to the firm's disclosure website at www.credit-suisse.com/researchdisclosures for the definitions of abbreviations typically used in the target price method and risk sections.

See the Companies Mentioned section for full company names.

The subject company (GE, GR, COL, UTX) currently is, or was during the 12-month period preceding the date of distribution of this report, a client of Credit Suisse.

Credit Suisse provided investment banking services to the subject company (GE, GR, COL, UTX) within the past 12 months.

Credit Suisse has managed or co-managed a public offering of securities for the subject company (GE) within the past 12 months.

Credit Suisse has received investment banking related compensation from the subject company (GE, GR) within the past 12 months.

Credit Suisse expects to receive or intends to seek investment banking related compensation from the subject company (GE, GR, COL, TXT, UTX) within the next 3 months.

As of the date of this report, Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC makes a market in the securities of the subject company (GE, GR, COL, TXT, UTX).

Important Regional Disclosures

Singapore recipients should contact a Singapore financial adviser for any matters arising from this research report.

An analyst involved in the preparation of this report has visited certain material operations of the subject company (GR, COL) within the past 12 months. The analyst may not have visited all material operations of the subject company. The travel expenses of the analyst in connection with such visits were not paid or reimbursed by the subject company, other than de minimus local travel expenses.

The analyst(s) involved in the preparation of this report have not visited the material operations of the subject company (GE, TXT, UTX) within the past 12 months.

Restrictions on certain Canadian securities are indicated by the following abbreviations: NVS--Non-Voting shares; RVS--Restricted Voting Shares; SVS--Subordinate Voting Shares.

Individuals receiving this report from a Canadian investment dealer that is not affiliated with Credit Suisse should be advised that this report may not contain regulatory disclosures the non-affiliated Canadian investment dealer would be required to make if this were its own report.

For Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc.'s policies and procedures regarding the dissemination of equity research, please visit http://www.csfb.com/legal_terms/canada_research_policy.shtml.

As of the date of this report, Credit Suisse acts as a market maker or liquidity provider in the equities securities that are the subject of this report.

Principal is not guaranteed in the case of equities because equity prices are variable.

Commission is the commission rate or the amount agreed with a customer when setting up an account or at anytime after that.

CS may have issued a Trade Alert regarding this security. Trade Alerts are short term trading opportunities identified by an analyst on the basis of market events and catalysts, while stock ratings reflect an analyst's investment recommendations based on expected total return over a 12-month period relative to the relevant coverage universe. Because Trade Alerts and stock ratings reflect different assumptions and analytical methods, Trade Alerts may differ directionally from the analyst's stock rating.

The author(s) of this report maintains a CS Model Portfolio that he/she regularly adjusts. The security or securities discussed in this report may be a component of the CS Model Portfolio and subject to such adjustments (which, given the composition of the CS Model Portfolio as a whole, may differ from the recommendation in this report, as well as opportunities or strategies identified in Trading Alerts concerning the same security). The CS Model Portfolio and important disclosures about it are available at www.credit-suisse.com/ti.

Taiwanese Disclosures: Reports written by Taiwan-based analysts on non-Taiwan listed companies are not considered recommendations to buy or sell securities under Taiwan Stock Exchange Operational Regulations Governing Securities Firms Recommending Trades in Securities to Customers.

To the extent this is a report authored in whole or in part by a non-U.S. analyst and is made available in the U.S., the following are important disclosures regarding any non-U.S. analyst contributors:

The non-U.S. research analysts listed below (if any) are not registered/qualified as research analysts with FINRA. The non-U.S. research analysts listed below may not be associated persons of CSSU and therefore may not be subject to the NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 restrictions on communications with a subject company, public appearances and trading securities held by a research analyst account.

Important Credit Suisse HOLT Disclosures

With respect to the analysis in this report based on the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology, Credit Suisse certifies that (1) the views expressed in this report accurately reflect the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology and (2) no part of the Firm's compensation was, is, or will be directly related to the specific views disclosed in this report.

The Credit Suisse HOLT methodology does not assign ratings to a security. It is an analytical tool that involves use of a set of proprietary quantitative algorithms and warranted value calculations, collectively called the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model, that are consistently applied to all the companies included in its database. Third-party data (including consensus earnings estimates) are systematically translated into a number of default variables and incorporated into the algorithms available in the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model. The source financial statement, pricing, and earnings data provided by outside data vendors are subject to quality control and may also be adjusted to more closely measure the underlying economics of firm performance. These adjustments provide consistency when analyzing a single company across time, or analyzing multiple companies across industries or national borders. The default scenario that is produced by the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model establishes the baseline valuation for a security, and a user then may adjust the default variables to produce alternative scenarios, any of which could occur. Additional information about the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology is available on request.

The Credit Suisse HOLT methodology does not assign a price target to a security. The default scenario that is produced by the Credit Suisse HOLT valuation model establishes a warranted price for a security, and as the third-party data are updated, the warranted price may also change. The default variables may also be adjusted to produce alternative warranted prices, any of which could occur.

CFROI®, HOLT, HOLTfolio, HOLTSelect, ValueSearch, AggreGator, Signal Flag and "Powered by HOLT" are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or registered service marks of Credit Suisse or its affiliates in the United States and other countries. HOLT is a corporate performance and valuation advisory service of Credit Suisse.

Additional information about the Credit Suisse HOLT methodology is available on request.

For Credit Suisse disclosure information on other companies mentioned in this report, please visit the website at www.credit-suisse.com/researchdisclosures or call +1 (877) 291-2683.

Disclaimers continue on next page.



This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Credit Suisse AG, the Swiss bank, or its subsidiaries or its affiliates ("CS") to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. All material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to CS. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of CS. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of CS or its affiliates.

The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation of an offer to sell or to buy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. CS may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor. CS will not treat recipients as its customers by virtue of their receiving the report. The investments or services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CS does not offer advice on the tax consequences of investment and you are advised to contact an independent tax adviser. Please note in particular that the bases and levels of taxation may change.

CS believes the information and opinions in the Disclosure Appendix of this report are accurate and complete. Information and opinions presented in the other sections of the report were obtained or derived from sources CS believes are reliable, but CS makes no representations as to their accuracy or completeness. Additional information is available upon request. CS accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report, except that this exclusion of liability does not apply to the extent that liability arises under specific statutes or regulations applicable to CS. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. CS may have issued, and may in the future issue, a trading call regarding this security. Trading calls are short term trading opportunities based on market events and catalysts, while stock ratings reflect investment recommendations based on expected total return over a 12-month period as defined in the disclosure section. Because trading calls and stock ratings reflect different assumptions and analytical methods, trading calls may differ directionally from the stock rating. In addition, CS may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and CS is under no obligation to ensure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report. CS is involved in many businesses that relate to companies mentioned in this report. These businesses include specialized trading, risk arbitrage, market making, and other proprietary trading.

Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgement at its original date of publication by CS and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price or income of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADR's, the values of which are influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk.

Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchange rates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their own investigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase.

Some investments discussed in this report have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment, in such circumstances you may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield. Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an investment is exposed.

This report may provide the addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to website material of CS, CS has not reviewed the linked site and takes no responsibility for the content contained therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to CS's own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and information and the content of the linked site does not in any way form part of this document. Accessing such website or following such link through this report or CS's website shall be at your own risk.

This report is issued and distributed in Europe (except Switzerland) by Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, England, which is regulated in the United Kingdom by The Financial Services Authority ("FSA"). This report is being distributed in Germany by Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited Niederlassung Frankfurt am Main regulated by the Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht ("BaFin"). This report is being distributed in the United States by Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC ; in Switzerland by Credit Suisse AG; in Canada by Credit Suisse Securities (Canada), Inc.; in Brazil by Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse (Brasil) S.A. or its affiliates; in Mexico by Banco Credit Suisse (México), S.A. (transactions related to the securities mentioned in this report will only be effected in compliance with applicable regulation); in Japan by Credit Suisse Securities (Japan) Limited, Financial Instrument Firm, Director-General of Kanto Local Finance Bureau (Kinsho) No. 66, a member of Japan Securities Dealers Association, The Financial Futures Association of Japan, Japan Securities Investment Advisers Association, Type II Financial Instruments Firms Association; elsewhere in Asia/Pacific by whichever of the following is the appropriately authorised entity in the relevant jurisdiction: Credit Suisse (Hong Kong) Limited, Credit Suisse Equities (Australia) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Thailand) Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Credit Suisse AG, Singapore Branch, Credit Suisse Securities (India) Private Limited regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (registration Nos. INB230970637; INF230970637; INB010970631; INF010970631), having registered address at 9th Floor, Ceejay House, Dr.A.B. Road, Worli, Mumbai - 18, India, T- +91-22 6777 3777, Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, Seoul Branch, Credit Suisse AG, Taipei Securities Branch, PT Credit Suisse Securities Indonesia, Credit Suisse Securities (Philippines) Inc., and elsewhere in the world by the relevant authorised affiliate of the above. Research on Taiwanese securities produced by Credit Suisse AG, Taipei Securities Branch has been prepared by a registered Senior Business Person. Research provided to residents of Malaysia is authorised by the Head of Research for Credit Suisse Securities (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd., to whom they should direct any queries on +603 2723 2020.

In jurisdictions where CS is not already registered or licensed to trade in securities, transactions will only be effected in accordance with applicable securities legislation, which will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may require that the trade be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements. Non-U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should contact a CS entity in their local jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise. U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should do so only by contacting a representative at Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC in the U.S.

Please note that this report was originally prepared and issued by CS for distribution to their market professional and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not market professional or institutional investor customers of CS should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report or for any necessary explanation of its contents. This research may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FSA or in respect of which the protections of the FSA for private customers and/or the UK compensation scheme may not be available, and further details as to where this may be the case are available upon request in respect of this report.

Any Nielsen Media Research material contained in this report represents Nielsen Media Research's estimates and does not represent facts. NMR has neither reviewed nor approved this report and/or any of the statements made herein.

If this report is being distributed by a financial institution other than Credit Suisse AG, or its affiliates, that financial institution is solely responsible for distribution. Clients of that institution should contact that institution to effect a transaction in the securities mentioned in this report or require further information. This report does not constitute investment advice by Credit Suisse to the clients of the distributing financial institution, and neither Credit Suisse AG, its affiliates, and their respective officers, directors and employees accept any liability whatsoever for any direct or consequential loss arising from their use of this report or its content.

Copyright 2011 CREDIT SUISSE AG and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC
United States of America: